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A single, long-run policeman faces a large population of myopic would-
be criminals. This paper shows that this interaction has counterintuitive
comparative static properties. A forward-looking inspector might tolerate
more law violations than a short-sighted one.
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11 Introduction
Game theoretical models of law-enforcement (Graetz e.a. [12], Tsebelis [16] [17],
Holler [11], Franckx [6], Saha and Poole [14], Cressmann e.a. [5], Andreozzi [1])
show a puzzling analogy with the predator-prey relationships studied in the-
oretical ecology: they have conterintuitive comparative static properties and
generate oscillations. Let start with comparative statics. Killing predators will
not reduce the number of predators, but will only increase the number of their
preys. Similarly, killing preys will only reduce the number of predators. In the
law enforcement literature a mathematically analogous result holds true. In-
creasing penalties will not reduce crime, but will only reduce the frequency of
police inspections. In general, the only way to change the behavior of would-be
criminals is to modify the policemen’s payo￿s and vice versa. This result has
been taken as a proof that the standard economic approach to crime deterrence
inspired to Gary Beker’s [3] seminal paper (that neglects strategic considera-
tions) might be ￿awed. (Tsebelis [16], Holler [11].)
Oscillations are due to the hypothesis that police agents and criminals form
two distinct populations of short-lived and myopic agents. Policemen inspect
would-be transgressors as long as they expect some of them to violate the law,
but they quit inspecting when they realize that violations are almost never
committed. However, if police do not inspect, then violations become more
frequent and this brings about a new wave of inspections. The analogies with
the oscillations of predator-prey relationships are obvious.
The hypothesis that both actors involved are myopic is not always realistic.
There are cases in which police is best modelled as a single, forward-looking ac-
tor, who faces a large population of myopic would-be transgressors. Examples
of this kind of interaction abound. Just think about the relationship between
tax-auditors and tax-payers, or police crews and motorists on highways. The
present paper asks the following question: should one expect to see more or
less crime if the police force is a long-lived, forward-looking agent rather than
a myopic one? (Neher [13] asks a similar question concerning the economics of
crime.) One might conjecture that a forward-looking police force will not quit
inspecting when law infractions become rare, because it anticipates that the
number of infractions will rise again if it does. Hence one would predict no os-
cillations and a lower level of crime in equilibrium. This paper shows that this
intuition is partially mistaken. Contrary to what one might expect, as the police
force becomes more forward-looking, more crime, not less, might be observed
in equilibrium. Some technical conditions at which such a counterintuitive phe-
nomenon can take place are investigated. I will also show that these conditions
are ful￿lled by some of the games discussed in the literature, for example by
Saha and Poole [14].
2Inspect Not Inspect
Violate a11;b11 a12;b12
Not Violate a21;b21 a22;b22
Table 1: The Inspection Game
2 The inspection game
Consider the game in Figure 2. Player A must decide whether to V iolate a given
law or a regulation. B is an inspector, or a police o￿cer, who might Inspect
him. The entries of the two matrices satisfy the following inequalities: a12 > a22
(violating the law is pro￿table if police does not inspect),a21 > a11 (respecting
the law is the best strategy if police inspect),b11 > b12 (police prefers to inspect
if the public violates the law) and b22 > b21 (police rather not inspect if the
public respects the law). Let p be the probability with which A plays V iolate




b22 ￿ b21 ￿ b12 + b11
;
a22 ￿ a12
a22 ￿ a12 ￿ a21 + a11
) (1)
Suppose now that the game is played repeatedly by pairs of individuals drawn
at random from two large populations A (the public) and B (the police). In
each population, strategies that yield a payo￿ larger than the average within that
population are assumed to increase, crowding out strategies that yield lower-
than-average payo￿s. This might re￿ect a process of learning, imitation and so
on. (See Weibull [18] for an accessible introduction to evolutionary models of
this kind.)
Formally, let p and q be the fractions of A and B that play V iolate and
Inspect respectively. I will assume that the learning and imitation process will
induce p and q to change over time according to the Replicator Dynamics (RD):
_ p = p(1 ￿ p)(￿B
1 (q) ￿ ￿B
2 (q)) = ￿p(1 ￿ p)(q￿ ￿ q) (2a)
_ q = q(1 ￿ q)(￿A
1 (p) ￿ ￿A
2 (p)) = ￿q(1 ￿ q)(p ￿ p￿) (2b)
where ￿ ￿ ￿a22+a21+a12￿a11 > 0 and ￿ = b22￿b21￿b12+b11 > 0. ￿A
i (p),
￿B
i (q) are the expected payo￿s of adopting strategy i (i = 1;2) in population A
and B. It is a well known fact in evolutionary game theory that the fractions p
and q oscillate constantly, although their averages converge to the equilibrium
values p￿ and q￿. (See Andreozzi [1] and Cressman e.a. [5] for an application of
this result to the logic of law enforcement.)
3 Evolutionary policies
The evolutionary model in the previous section is based on the hypothesis that
both populations are made of limitedly rational and myopic players. Suppose
3now that agent B is a a single organization (the police force, the tax authority
and so on.) The frequency q with which it plays Inspect will now re￿ect the long
term interest of this collective agent, instead of the aggregation of a multitude of
individual (myopic) choices. Nothing changes in population A, whose internal
dynamics is still represented by the di￿erential equation (2a).
Since now B is a rational, forward-looking player, she will choose a path
for the frequency q(t) with which she plays Inspect that maximizes the actual
value of the future stream of payo￿:
￿B(p(t);q(t)) = b11pq + b12p(1 ￿ q) + b21(1 ￿ p)q + b22(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ q)
subject to the constraint that the frequency p(t) of law infractions varies







s:t: _ p = ￿p(1 ￿ p)(q￿ ￿ q)
p(0) = p0 2 (0;1) q(t) 2 [0;1] 8t 2 [0;1)
where r is B’s time discount rate.1 The current-value Hamiltonian for this
problem is
H(p(t);q(t);m(t)) = ￿B(p(t);q(t)) + m(t)[￿p(1 ￿ p)(q￿ ￿ q)] (4)
where the costate variable m(t) satis￿es2:






￿ m￿(1 ￿ 2p)(q￿ ￿ q)
= m(r ￿ ￿(q￿ ￿ q)(1 ￿ 2p)) ￿ ￿(q ￿ q+), (5)
where q+ def
= b22￿b12
b11￿b12￿b21+b22. A stationary optimal path is a triple (￿ p; ￿ q; ￿ m)
such that _ p = _ m = 0 for p = ￿ p; q = ￿ q and m = ￿ m, while for every q 6= ￿ q,
H(￿ p; ￿ q; ￿ m) > H(￿ p;q; ￿ m). If initially p0 = ￿ p, a rational inspector B maximizes
his payo￿s by setting q = ￿ q, so that _ p = _ m = 0.
Lemma 1 The optimal control problem (3) has a unique stationary optimal
path:






￿(￿ m￿ ￿ ￿) ￿
p
(￿ m￿ ￿ ￿)2 + 4￿ m￿￿p￿
2￿ m￿
(8)
1Notice that the initial fraction of law infractions p0 has been restricted to the open interval
(0;1). This is to avoid that the population gets locked in a steady state in which _ p = 0 even
if the two pure strategies yield di￿erent payo￿s.
2Consider that it is easy (if tedious) to show that @￿
@p = ￿(q ￿ q+).
4Proof. To see that (￿ q; ￿ m; ￿ p) is a stationary optimal path for the control problem
(3) consider ￿rst that for any p 2 (0;1), _ p = 0 i￿ q = q￿. If q = q￿, then equation
(5) reduces to _ m = rm ￿ ￿(q￿ ￿ q+), and hence
_ m = 0 () m =
￿(q￿ ￿ q+)
r
= ￿ m (9)
Since ￿ q = q￿ is an interior solution, we must have
@H(p;q;m)
@q
= ￿(p ￿ p￿) ￿ ￿ m￿p(1 ￿ p) = 0 (10)
that is ￿ m￿p2 + p(￿ ￿ ￿ m￿) ￿ ￿p￿ = 0. The roots of this equation are:
p12 =
￿(￿ m￿ ￿ ￿) ￿
p
(￿ m￿ ￿ ￿)2 + 4￿ m￿￿p￿
2￿ m￿
: (11)
It can be easily shown that the smaller of the two roots lies in the interval
[0;1]. This is the only value of p that satisfy the optimality condition (10) and
the restriction on the state variable p 2 (0;1). This completes the ￿rst part of
the proof.
To see that (￿ p; ￿ q; ￿ m) is the only stationary optimal path, consider that for
q 6= q￿ _ p = 0 i￿ p = 0 or p = 1. However, if p0 2 (0;1), then p cannot reach
either 0 or 1 in a ￿nite time (because _ p ! 0 as p approaches the borders of the
interval [0;1]), so that if q 6= q￿ then _ p 6= 0 for all t. This completes the proof.
The Hamiltonian (4) is linear in the control variable q and has a single
interior stationary optimal path.3 This implies that the optimal control problem
3 in the general case in which p0 6= ￿ p, has a particularly simple solution: B must
choose q in such a way that the state variable p approaches its optimal stationary
value ￿ p in the shortest time. This is the content of the following:
Proposition 2 1.The optimal strategy S for the long run inspector B is:
a) if p < ￿ p, then q = 0;
b) if p > ￿ p, then q = 1;
c) if p = ￿ p, then q = q￿.
2. Under the optimal strategy S, from any initial condition p0 2 (0;1)
population A reaches its stationary optimal path level ￿ p in a ￿nite time ￿ t. After
that time, B sets q = q￿ so that p remains ￿xed at ￿ p.
Proof. 1. Because of the linearity of the Hamiltonian (4), the optimal path
is the one that minimizes the time spent out of the optimal stationary path
(￿ p; ￿ q; ￿ m). (Proofs of this fact can be found in Kamien and Schwarts [9], section
16, Takayama [15] and Clark [4].) Since argmax
q
(_ p) = 0 and argmin
q
(_ p) = 1, if
p < ￿ p (p > ￿ p), the optimal policy for B is to set q = 0 (q = 1). On the other
hand, if p = ￿ p, then q = q￿ so that _ p = 0.
3To see that the Hamiltonian in linear in q consider that the inspector’s payo￿ function
￿B(:;:) is linear both in p and in q, and that RD is linear in q, although not in p.
52. Suppose that p0 < ￿ p (the case p0 > ￿ p can be treated similarly). In this
case B will set q = 0, so that equation (2a) reduces to a simple logistic equation
_ p = p(1 ￿ p)q￿ (12)
that can be integrated
p(t) =
1
1 ￿ exp(k ￿ q￿t)
; (13)
where k = log
(p0￿1)
p0 . It follows that the time it takes to bring p to its
optimal level ￿ p is
￿ t =
1
q￿[k ￿ log(￿ p ￿ 1)]: (14)
which is bounded away from 1: After a time ￿ t, B will set q = q￿ so that
_ p = 0:
Proposition 2 shows that population A will spend most of the time at ￿ p,
because the inspector will minimize the time it spends outside this state. Hence,
it is interesting to see how changes in the police’s time discount rate r a￿ect ￿ p.
Proposition 3 (a) The optimal stationary value ￿ p converges to the stage game
Nash equilibrium value ￿ p ! p￿ as r ! 1; (b) ￿ p > p￿ and ￿ p ! 1 as r ! 0 if
q￿ > q+; (c) ￿ p < p￿ and ￿ p ! 0 as r ! 0 if q￿ < q+.




r ! 0. Recall that ￿ p is the smallest root of
￿ m￿p2 +p(￿ ￿ ￿ m￿)￿￿p￿ = 0, which for ￿ m ! 0 reduces to p￿ ￿p￿￿ = 0, whose
only root is p = p￿:









The left hand side approaches 1 as ￿ m ! +1 and hence p ! 1 (If p ! 0,
then the right hand side would approach ￿1). Similarly, the left hand side
approaches minus in￿nite as ￿ m ! +1, so that p ! 0.
Proposition 3 is the core of the paper. It proves that if the inspector is
rational, but myopic (r ! 1), it will keep the frequency of law violations
around its Nash equilibrium value p￿. This is not surprising: if p > p￿, the
inspector gets a larger payo￿ if she plays Inspect. In so doing, however, she
reduces the frequency of law infractions p until it reaches the Nash equilibrium
level p￿. At this point Inspect and NotInspect yield the same payo￿. Similarly,
if initially p < p￿, a myopic inspector will play NotInspect because it yields a
larger immediate payo￿ than Inspect. However, this will increase the frequency
of violations p until it reaches p￿.
When the inspector becomes more forward looking, (r ! 0) it will take into
consideration the future e￿ects of her current choices. Since he will not play
the strategy that yields the larger immediate payo￿, the optimal level of crime
6violations ￿ p will be di￿erent from p￿. The interesting result of this analysis is
that increasing r will not necessarily reduce ￿ p below p￿. Proposition 3 shows
that this will happen only provided that q￿ < q+. When the opposite inequality
holds true, a more forward looking inspector will tolerate more crime than a
short-sighted one.
4 Conclusions
Andreozzi [2] discusses a variant of the inspection game in which the inspector
can act as a Stackelberg leader of the game and he obtains a result similar to
those presented in Proposition 3. He shows that if the inspector can commit
himself to a probability of inspection, he will induce player A to play V iolate
if q￿ > q+ and to play Not V iolate if q￿ < q+. The present paper extends this
result to the case in which the inspector (who cannot commit to a probability
of inspection) is a long-run player facing a large population of short-sighted
opponents, in the the spirit of Fudenberg and Levine [7] [8]. All the consequences
of this result for the economic approach to law enforcement are discussed in
Andreozzi [2] and will not be repeated here.
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